Fines, Structural Sanctions, and Regulated Self-Regulation: The Effectiveness and Limits of Criminal Sanctions Applicable to Legal Entities in Spain and Mexico

Abstract

This article examines the legal framework governing the criminal liability of legal persons in Spain and Mexico, highlighting the transition from models of vicarious liability to approaches characterized, to varying degrees, by corporate self-responsibility. In Spain, the Supreme Court has consolidated a model of strict self-responsibility conceived as a form of “corporate crime.” In Mexico, the picture is more complex due to the heterogeneity of federal and state regulations, with a lack of coherence at the federal level in conceptualizing the liability model between the provisions of the Federal Criminal Code and those of the National Code of Criminal Procedure. Against this regulatory background, the catalogues of criminal sanctions in both countries, aligned with international standards, combine an economic model (centered on dissuasive pecuniary sanctions, primarily fines) with a structural model composed of interdictive sanctions. However, legal scholarship has identified a criminal policy dysfunction: although the system purports to promote prevention and corporate self-regulation, these sanctions are mainly oriented toward a negative preventive dimension, both general and special, and lack a clear aim of corporate resocialization. Accordingly, the article argues for an evolution toward a sanctioning regime that combines deterrence with this rehabilitative purpose, incorporates the perspective of victims, and includes sanctions that foster genuine internal reorganization and a culture of corporate compliance.